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In recent years there has been an increasing interest 
in testing experimentally to what extent emotions can 
influence moral judgments (e.g., Greene, 2007; Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Strohminger, 
Lewis, & Meyer, 2011; Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). A common means of inves-
tigating this issue has been to induce emotions exper-
imentally and subsequently present people with moral 
dilemmas, asking them to decide whether a proposed 
action should be conducted or not. For instance, in the 
footbridge dilemma a train which is out of control is 
heading towards five people who are standing on the 
track, and who will be killed if nothing is done. One must 
judge whether a large person should be pushed off a foot-
bridge in order to stop the train before it reaches the five 
people (Thomson, 1976). Recent studies have revealed 
that judgments concerning such dilemmas can vary as a 
function of the different emotions induced, including 
negatively valenced emotions such as anger or disgust 
(Ugazio et al., 2012), and positive ones such as mirth or 
elevation (Strohminger et al., 2011; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 
2006).
Another common means of investigating the effect 
of emotions on moral judgment has been to ask people 
to evaluate the wrongness of moral transgressions con-
ducted by others (e.g., a person eating his dead dog for 
dinner), following the emotional induction. Due to the 
strong link documented in the literature between dis-
gust and concerns about moral violations of purity 
(Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; see also Horberg, 
Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Olivera & Roselló, 2013), this 
emotion has received special attention in this kind of 
studies. People have been found to make more severe 
judgments (i.e., they more often judge actions as wrong) 
when they feel disgust induced through an hypnotic 
suggestion (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), an odor with 
strong stink, the recall of a disgusting experience (Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008), taste (i.e., a bitter beverage; 
Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011), or even through the 
sound of an emetic event (i.e., a person vomiting; 
Seidel & Prinz, 2013).
In contrast, fewer studies have examined the impact 
of positive emotions on judgments concerning moral 
transgressions, and those that examined this issue did 
not report clear effects. For instance, Seidel and Prinz 
(2012) used music to induce both a positive emotion 
(happiness) and a negative one (anger), and found that 
only the latter affected participants’ judgments by 
increasing their severity. Similarly, Eskine et al. (2011) 
found that participants who drank a bitter beverage 
(i.e., with negative valence) before rating moral vignettes 
exhibited more severe moral judgments than those who 
drank water, while judgments of participants who had 
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a sweet beverage (i.e., with positive valence) did not 
differ significantly from those of participants who had 
water. Contrasting with these results, a popular study 
conducted by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) found 
an effect of positive emotions on moral judgments. 
Specifically, these authors found that individuals who 
were induced to feel positive affect through a comedy 
clip were more likely to endorse utilitarian actions in the 
footbridge dilemma than those who viewed a neutral clip 
(i.e., participants who viewed the comedy clip were more 
likely to endorse the action of throwing a person from a 
bridge to save a larger number of people). However, this 
study focused on assessing participants’ decisions con-
cerning moral dilemmas, and thus it is unclear whether 
the observed effects would generalize to evaluations of 
moral transgressions (for a discussion concerning the dis-
tinction between deciding in moral dilemmas and react-
ing to moral violations, see Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007).
In sum, past work suggests that judgments concern-
ing moral transgressions can be affected by negative 
emotions, while evidence for an effect of positive emo-
tions is limited. Moreover, the mechanisms underlying 
the effect of negative and positive emotions on judg-
ments concerning moral transgressions (or lack thereof) 
are at present unclear. Previous studies often failed to 
control for the effect of arousal of the induced emotions 
(e.g., Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), leaving it unclear to 
what extent any differences observed for the effects of 
negative and positive emotions can be attributed to dif-
ferences in stimulus valence or instead to differences 
in the associated arousal. Taking this into account, the 
main aim of the present research was to investigate how 
judgments concerning moral transgressions are affected 
by emotions with both negative and positive valence, 
while controlling for the effect of arousal.
Negative emotions can be associated with higher 
levels of arousal than positives ones, particularly among 
female (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005; Mourão-
Miranda et al., 2003). Higher levels of arousal, in turn, 
may draw people’s attention to the morally salient fea-
tures of the environment to a larger extent (Huebner, 
Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009). This would imply that previ-
ously observed effects of negative emotions such as 
disgust might have been driven to some extent by 
attentional and motivational processes1. A failure to 
elicit comparable levels of arousal for positive emotions 
might account, at least partially, for the failure to find a 
clear effect of such emotions in past work. Alternatively, 
it might be the case that negatively valenced emotions 
are more prone to affect moral judgments than positive 
ones, independently of arousal. As noted above, distin-
guishing between these alternative possibilities requires 
testing the effect of one emotion dimension (valence) 
while controlling for the other one (arousal). In the pre-
sent work we aimed to disentangle the effects of valence 
and arousal on moral judgments by employing the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 
2005). This instrument includes a wide range of nor-
matively rated images, allowing the possibility of select-
ing those that differ in valence but elicit similar levels 
of arousal.
A secondary goal of the present work was to analyze 
systematically a set of moral transgressions with the aim 
of avoiding ceiling and floor effects which may over-
shadow the detection of any effect of affective images 
on people’s judgments. We reasoned that the effect of 
emotions on moral judgments might be modulated 
to some extent by the degree of agreement with the 
actions described in the vignettes to be evaluated. In line 
with this notion, some authors have analyzed people’s 
agreement with utilitarian solutions to dilemmas as a 
basis to classify dilemmas in terms of low vs. high con-
flict (Koenigs et al., 2007), while others have excluded 
from their analyses those dilemmas where the majority 
of people either agreed or disagreed with the utilitarian 
solution (Suter & Hertwig, 2011). Furthermore, some 
have adjusted the content of dilemmas of moral trans-
gressions attempting to bring acceptability ratings closer 
to the mid-point of the scale (Paxton, Ungar, & Green, 
2011; Seidel & Prinz, 2013). This suggests that past 
work has recognized that the degree of agreement with 
the actions can modulate the effect of different exper-
imental manipulations. However, to the best of our 
knowledge no attempts were made to measure system-
atically the degree of agreement associated with dif-
ferent moral transgressions, prior to testing the effect 
of the experimental manipulations carried out in each 
case. Taking this into account, in Study 1 we developed 
a questionnaire of vignettes describing moral transgres-
sions according to statistical criteria. In Study 2 we 
administered this questionnaire to participants, after 
they had been exposed to images inducing positive 
emotions, negative emotions, or no particular emotion.
STUDY 1
In this study we sought to develop a questionnaire 
including vignettes where: (a) people seldom responded 
near the extreme points of the response scale, and (b) 
there was a high degree of variability (variance) in 
1It has been argued that disgust has a unique influence on moral 
judgment due to its direct link with nausea and underlying perceptions 
of impurity and contamination (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; 
Horberg et al., 2011), and its influence has been distinguished from 
that of other negatively-valenced emotions such as anger (Salerno & 
Peter-Hagene, 2013; Schnall et al., 2008). However, following Lang et al., 
2005 (see also Mourão-Miranda et al., 2003), here we focused on exam-
ining the emotional dimensions of valence and arousal in order to 
disentangle their effect, rather than on specific properties of discrete 
emotions (e.g., cognitive appraisals linked to the emotions).
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participants’ evaluations of the described behavior. 
We also sought to include two vignettes with the oppo-
site psychometrical features (i.e., where people often 
responded with ratings near the ends of the response 
scale and there was little variability in participants’ 
evaluations; in other words, vignettes where the great 
majority of people judged the action as either acceptable 
or unacceptable), in order to test the effect of emotions 
on this kind of vignettes as well in Study 2.
Materials and Method
Participants
One hundred and ten undergraduate students (85 
females) were recruited from the Faculty of Psychology 
of the Universidad de Granada, and participated in 
exchange of course credit. Participants were informed 
that they could abandon the study at any time without 
any negative consequences. This and the following study 
were conducted in compliance with the regulations of 
the Ethics Committee of the University of Granada.
Procedure
Study 1 was comprised of three phases: (1) elaboration 
of a questionnaire of moral vignettes (in Spanish); 
(2) administration of the questionnaire to the student 
sample previously described; and (3) selection of the 
vignettes that should be included in the final version of 
the questionnaire to be used in Study 2.
Phase 1:
The selection of the vignettes to be included in the ini-
tial version of the questionnaire was carried out on the 
basis of four criteria established a priori to accommo-
date the aims of the present research. Specifically, we 
selected vignettes that: (1) were brief (with a maximum 
of 70 words), to ensure that the effects of the emotional 
induction applied in Study 2 would be present at 
the time of completion of the moral judgment task; 
(2) were written in third person, to constrain judg-
ments to evaluations of other people’s behavior, where 
the participant is merely a passive witness (for evi-
dence on differences between judging transgressions 
conducted by oneself vs. by others, see Valdesolo & 
DeSteno, 2008); (3) had varied moral content, to enhance 
the generalizability of our findings; and (4) mainly 
reflected real life scenarios, to preserve ecological 
validity.
We selected, translated, and adapted several moral 
vignettes. Some of them were gently provided by 
R. O’Hara, from the study conducted by O’Hara, 
Sinnott-Armstrong, and Sinnott-Armstrong (2010), 
and others were obtained from Knutson et al. (2010), 
and Schnall et al. (2008). In most cases the vignettes 
were adapted to the cultural context of Spain2. The 
result of this process was a questionnaire including 
32 items in which a character faces a situation and 
performs an act which is morally assessable.
Phase 2:
Participants were instructed to assess to which extent 
the behavior exhibited by the actor in each vignette 
was acceptable, using a 9-point Likert scale ranging 
from very unacceptable (1) to very acceptable (9). To avoid 
extended reasoning that could interfere with the effect 
of emotions in Study 2, participants were asked to pro-
vide their first impression concerning the characters’ 
behavior.
Phase 3:
The items were analyzed and ten moral vignettes 
were then selected according to statistical criteria. 
The rationale underlying the selection of a limited 
number of vignettes was the same as that for the word 
limit described above. That is, we sought to maximize 
the chances that the effect of the emotions induced in 
Study 2 would still be present at the time of judgment. 
The final questionnaire consisted of two sets of five 
brief vignettes.
Results
In order to identify the eight vignettes that better suited 
the criteria outlined above (i.e., where people seldom 
responded near the extreme points of the response 
scale, and with a high degree of variability in ratings), 
we submitted the 32 initial items to a descriptive analysis. 
As noted above, we also selected two vignettes with 
the opposite features (i.e., those which yielded the most 
extreme judgments). The first eight vignettes had means 
ranging from 4.75 to 6.34 (M = 5.57), and variances 
ranging from 5.04 to 6.98 (M = 5.69). The two additional 
vignettes had the lowest (M = 1.66) and the highest 
(M = 7.14) means, as well as the lowest variances 
(S2 = 1.03 and S2 = 2.64, respectively). That is, the first 
of these additional vignettes can be considered of high 
severity (as it received low acceptability ratings), while 
the other one can be considered of low severity (as it 
received high acceptability ratings). The full text of all 
the selected vignettes is included in the Appendix.
STUDY 2
The main aim of this study was to examine how induced 
emotions with different valence and similar arousal 
affect moral judgments. We used a design similar to 
2This involved changing the names of the characters, geographical loca-
tions, monetary currencies, and measurement units, where relevant.
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that employed by Eskine et al. (2011) to study the impact 
of gustatory disgust on moral judgment, in which 
participants were assigned to a positive (sweet), a 
negative (bitter), or a neutral (water) emotional con-
dition. Instead of flavors, we employed images as 
stimuli to induce positive and negative emotions, or 
no particular emotion. After the emotional induction 
phase, participants were instructed to rate the moral 
vignettes included in the questionnaire developed in 
Study 1.
For the first eight vignettes we expected to find 
differences in participants’ judgments related to the 
valence of the emotions induced. In line with previous 
research, we hypothesized that judgments would be 
more severe in the negative-valence group, as com-
pared to both the positive-valence and the control 
groups (H1). Regarding the positive-valence group, 
if arousal affects moral reasoning, then judgments 
should also be affected in this group. In line with the 
studies that succeeded to find an effect of positive 
emotions (e.g., Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), we expected 
that the direction of the effect would be opposite to 
that of the negative emotion. That is, judgments should 
be less severe in the positive-valence group than in 
the negative and the control groups (H2a). In contrast, 
if arousal does not affect moral reasoning, then the 
positive emotion may show no effect (H2b). Predictions 
regarding the two extremely rated vignettes were less 
clear. In line with our hypothesis for the first eight 
vignettes, it is plausible to assume that the negative 
emotion might increase the severity of judgments for 
the vignette of low severity, whereas the positive 
emotion might decrease severity of judgments for 
the vignette of high severity. However, it might also 
be the case that moral transgressions which are 
judged more extremely are less sensitive to the effect 
of emotions. If this is the case, then no effect of emo-
tions should be observed for these two vignettes.
Materials and Method
Participants
Seventy psychology undergraduate students (50 females; 
mean age 20 years) were recruited from the Universidad 
de Granada, and participated in exchange of course 
credit. Participants were informed that they could aban-
don the study at any time without any negative conse-
quences. Three participants were excluded from the 
final analyses; two of them failed to complete all sections 
of the study and one guessed correctly the hypothesis 
of the study (see Procedure for a description of the specific 
questions participants had to answer). Thus, the final 
sample included 67 participants (positive condition, 
n = 22; negative condition, n = 23; neutral condition, 
n = 22).
Instruments
Moral vignettes:
To assess moral judgments we used the vignettes 
included in the questionnaire created in Study 1 (see 
Appendix). As in Study 1, participants were required 
to assess to which extent the behavior exhibited by the 
actor in each vignette was acceptable using a 9-point 
Likert scale ranging from very unacceptable (1) to very 
acceptable (9). Two forms of the questionnaire were 
used to counterbalance the order in which vignettes 
were presented. The first five items in form A were the 
last five items for form B and vice versa; each half con-
tained one of the two items with extreme ratings and 
four items of the remaining eight.
Emotional Images:
As noted above, to induce emotions with different 
valence we used three categories of images (positive, 
negative, and neutral). Each category contained four 
images. Most of them were obtained from the IAPS 
database (Lang et al., 2005) and were specifically selected 
according to their valence and arousal scores from the 
Spanish adaption of IAPS with the aim that the emo-
tional groups differed in valence rating while were 
similar in arousal rating (Moltó et al., 1999; Vila et al., 
2001; the four positive ones, numbers 8496, 8461, 
8186, and 2071, average valence and arousal ratings: 
7.85 and 6.05, respectively; the four neutral ones, 
numbers 7025, 7041, 7175, and 7100, 5.13 and 2.97, 
respectively; and the 2nd and the 4th of the negative 
ones, numbers 9301 and 9405, 2.02 and 6.78, respec-
tively). Additionally, two images were selected from 
the Internet using Google (1st and 3rd of the negative 
ones).3
Manipulation check:
To assess the emotional effects of the presented images, 
and in order to check whether the average valence 
and arousal ratings showed the expected pattern 
according to the reported values in the Spanish adap-
tation of the IAPS, we used the Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). The SAM is a non-
verbal pictorial assessment technique that measures 
different components of affective reactions. Here it 
was employed to measure the valence and arousal 
associated with the images. It is important to note 
that participants assessed the images after completing 
all moral judgment tasks, and consequently this 
assessment was memory-based rather than performed 
real-time.
3These images can be found at the followings URL addresses: http://
i47.tinypic.com/24l5zd0.jpg, and http://i45.tinypic.com/2uym9a8.jpg
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Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
three experimental conditions described above. First, 
they were provided with an informed consent form 
stating that the aim of the study was to “test the effect 
of certain images in their emotional memory when 
performing linguistic interference tasks”. In the instruc-
tions we insisted on two issues: First, participants were 
requested to look carefully at the images as they would 
be asked about them at the end of the task. The aim of 
this instruction was to enhance the effect of the emo-
tional induction. Second, as in Study 1, participants were 
instructed to answer according to their first impression 
of the behavior of the character in each vignette. As noted 
above, the aim of this instruction was to avoid extended 
reasoning that could potentially interfere with the 
effect of emotions.
Images were presented in group sessions using a 
3-LCD Sony projector at an auditorium in the univer-
sity. Participants were exposed to two 2-picture sets 
separated by a 3-min interval. First, two images were 
presented for 6 seconds each with no interval between 
them. Afterwards, participants evaluated five moral 
vignettes of the respective form of the questionnaire 
(A or B); then two more images were presented followed 
by the remaining five vignettes. The two sets of five 
vignettes were placed on different pages to prevent 
participants from seeing the second set of vignettes 
before being presented with the second set of images. 
Once participants finished the questionnaire they were 
asked to remember the images they had seen and to 
rate their valence and their arousal using the SAM. 
Finally, they answered one short question evaluating 
whether they had guessed the real purpose of the study 
(What do you think the hypothesis of the study was?) and 
another one evaluating whether that hypothesis had in 
fact affected their answers (Did the hypothesis that you 
indicated in the previous question affect your answers during 
the experiment?). The latter question aimed to distinguish 
the hypotheses that participants may have held during 
the experiment from those which they may have consid-
ered as a result of being asked the first question. Finally, 
participants were debriefed.
Results
Manipulation check
First, we performed two one-way ANOVAs to examine 
the effects of the emotional induction on valence and 
arousal ratings. The main effect of emotional condition 
was significant both for valence, F(2, 66) = 93.54, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.74, and for arousal, F(2, 66) = 17.33, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.35. Pairwise least significance difference (LSD) 
comparisons showed the expected pattern of results, 
with the positive group assigning higher valence ratings 
to images than both the control group, p < .001, d = 1.91, 
and the negative group, p < .001, d = 4.67. The two 
latter groups also differed between them, as ratings 
were lower in the negative group than in the control 
group, p < .001, d = 1.93 (see Figure 1). In addition, par-
ticipants in both the negative and the positive groups 
rated the images as more arousing than participants in 
the control group, p < .001, d = 1.47 and p < .001, d = 1.58, 
respectively. However, no significant differences were 
found in arousal between the negative and the positive 
groups, p = .60; d = 0.16 These results indicate that par-
ticipants in the positive and negative groups rated the 
images differently in terms of valence but not in terms 
of arousal, implying that the emotional induction may 
be considered effective.
Effects of the emotional induction on moral judgments
In order to reduce variability, we computed the average 
rating across the eight vignettes of intermediate severity 
for each participant (see e.g., Amit & Greene, 2012; 
Eskine et al., 2011; Seidel & Prinz, 2012, for a similar 
procedure) before conducting a mixed-design ANOVA 
with emotion as between-subject factor (positive, neutral, 
and negative), and kind of vignette (low, intermediate, 
and high severity) as within-subject factor. Mauchly’s 
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated, χ2(2) = 12.63, p = .002, therefore degrees 
of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimates of sphericity (ε = .84). There was a significant 
main effect of vignette, F(1.69, 108.31) = 182.20, p < .0001, 
ηp2 = 0.74, and an interaction between emotion and 
kind of vignette, F(3.38, 108.31) = 3.63, p = .008, ηp2 = 0.10. 
The main effect of emotion was not significant, F < 1. 
In line with H1, pairwise LSD comparisons revealed 
that, for vignettes of intermediate severity, participants 
Figure 1. Mean valence and arousal ratings for the images 
as a function of the emotion induced. Error bars represent 
± standard error of the mean.
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in the negative group were marginally more severe in 
their judgments than those in the control group p = .054, 
d = 0.60. Participants in the negative group were also 
more severe than those in the positive group, p = .002, 
d = 1.02, (see Table 1). However, differences between 
the positive and the control groups were not reliable, 
p = .196, d = 0.37, even though mean ratings in the pos-
itive group were higher at the descriptive level than in 
the control group (i.e., judgments were less severe in 
the former case). Therefore the data do not provide 
support for H2a, as judgments in the positive group 
differed significantly only from those in the negative 
group. Instead, the data are in line with H2b (i.e., they 
indicate that the positive emotion did not reliably affect 
judgments, for vignettes of intermediate severity).
Pairwise LSD comparisons also revealed that, for the 
vignette of high severity, the positive emotion was asso-
ciated with an increase in the severity of judgments, 
as compared to the control group, p = .011, d = 0.75. 
No other statistically significant differences in judgments 
were observed as a function of emotional condition for 
the vignettes of high or low severity (ps > .1).
Overall, these results suggest that moral transgres-
sions which are judged more extremely might be less 
sensitive to the effect of emotions. However, these find-
ings should be interpreted with caution given the unex-
pected result that judgments were more severe in the 
positive group than in the control group, for the high 
severity vignette4.
General Discussion
In the present paper we examined the effect of emotions 
with both negative and positive valence on people’s 
judgments concerning a series of moral transgressions. 
Emotions were induced using positive and negative 
affective images specifically selected in an attempt 
to match their levels of arousal. In line with previous 
research (e.g., Eskine et al., 2011; Schnall et al., 2008; 
Seidel & Prinz, 2013), our results showed that the 
induction of an emotion with negative valence led to 
an increased severity in moral judgments, for vignettes 
that were not associated with extreme judgments. 
Additionally, our results indicated that an emotion 
with positive valence did not reliably affect judg-
ments concerning such vignettes. Importantly, while 
the negative and positive images were rated differ-
ently in terms of their valence, they were matched in 
arousal as expected.
These findings contribute to shed light on previously 
documented differences in the effect of positive and 
negative emotions on judgments concerning moral 
transgressions. We reasoned that the effects of negative 
emotions documented in past work may have been 
determined, at least partly, by attentional and motiva-
tional processes linked to higher levels of arousal elicited 
by such emotions. However, our finding that moral 
judgments concerning vignettes of intermediate severity 
were not affected by positive images (that triggered 
levels of arousal similar to those triggered by negative 
images) suggests that this is likely not the case. Our 
findings also suggest that the failure to find a clear 
effect of positive emotions on moral judgments in past 
work is likely not linked to the specific methodology 
used to elicit emotions. It could be argued that visual 
stimuli may be more effective to induce emotions than 
tastes or sounds, or those images may increase the 
salience of some aspects of moral scenarios (Amit & 
Greene, 2012). However, the use of arousing images as 
a means to induce both positive and negative emotions 
in our study yielded results in line with those observed 
in past work involving different induction methods. 
That is, our findings point to the notion that negatively 
valenced emotions are more prone to affect moral judg-
ments than positive ones, regardless of the sensory 
modality employed for emotional induction.
In the present work we also conducted an a priori 
selection of vignettes based on psychometrical charac-
teristics, as we reasoned that the degree of agreement 
with the actions described in the vignettes could poten-
tially modulate the effect of emotions (i.e., vignettes 
Table 1. Moral judgments of acceptability as a function of the emotion induced and type of vignette
Positive Negative Neutral
Type of Vignette M SD M SD M SD
Intermediate severity (8 items) 5.51 1.05 4.52 0.87 5.11 1.08
High severity (1 item) 1.50 1.10 2.00 1.34 2.72 2.05
Low severity (1 item) 6.77 1.74 7.13 1.51 6.50 2.06
Note: Minimum and maximum ratings for each item were 1 and 9. High ratings indicate moral acceptability (i.e., low severity); 
low ratings indicate moral condemnation (i.e., high severity).
4An inspection of the distributions of responses for this item revealed 
a pronounced positive skew in the negative and positive emotional 
conditions, with most responses clustered around the mean. While a 
positive skew was also observed in the control group, four participants 
in this group gave acceptability ratings of 6 or higher.
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which generally lead to extreme ratings might be less 
prone to be affected by emotions). Taking this into 
account, we selected vignettes for which moral ratings 
were near the mid-point of the scale and which led to 
a high variability in ratings. In addition, we included 
two vignettes where people often responded with rat-
ings near the ends of the response scale and that were 
associated with little variability in participants’ evalu-
ations. No reliable effects of induced emotions were 
detected for one of these vignettes, namely the vignette 
of low severity (i.e., that generally received high accept-
ability ratings). A possible interpretation of this finding 
is that moral transgressions which are judged more 
extremely are less sensitive to the effect of emotions. 
As an alternative explanation, the effect of emotions 
may simply be more difficult to observe in vignettes 
which are rated extremely, due to ceiling and floor 
effects. Unexpectedly, we also found that the positive 
emotion was associated with an increase in the severity 
of judgments concerning the vignette of high severity 
(i.e., that generally received low acceptability ratings). 
Firm conclusions cannot be established on the basis of 
this result, given that only one item with high severity 
was tested in our study. Future research testing a larger 
number of scenarios of similar nature is needed to 
determine whether emotions can indeed affect judg-
ments for some moral transgressions that are generally 
associated with a high degree of consensus.
Finally, the current work also has some limitations 
and suggests new directions for future research. First, 
while our results contribute to the understanding of 
the effect of emotions on moral judgments, the precise 
mechanism underlying this effect remains unclear. 
One possibility is that the affective value of a moral 
scenario which, on average, does not produce a clear 
affective response may be “disambiguated” by the 
feelings (for instance, “gut feelings”) produced by the 
induced emotion (Damasio, 1994). Thus, participants 
may rely on the induced emotion when assessing the 
acceptability of the act described in the vignette, in a 
manner congruent with the valence of the emotion 
(i.e., less acceptable for negative emotions such as dis-
gust). In this sense the emotion would provide a basis 
to find an answer to a question for which a clear 
response cannot be found, in a way similar to how 
affective heuristics operate: using affect to guide judg-
ment and decision making (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
Slovic & Peters, 2006). However, according to this 
account it is unclear why we failed to find an effect 
of the positive emotion on judgments for vignettes of 
intermediate severity. Alternatively, the induced emo-
tion may produce an affective priming automatically 
(Musch & Klauer, 2003), activating evaluative responses 
accordingly to valence, and affecting the conscious 
assessment of the moral situation. Investigating these 
issues is beyond the scope of the present research and 
methods. However, future research could seek to address 
directly these questions.
Second, the exact point at which emotions affect the 
process of moral judgment also remains undetermined. 
It could be the case that the emotion does not influence 
judgment, but the interpretation of the scenario, the 
evaluation of the outcome or the interpretation of the 
test question (Huebner et al., 2009; Waldmann, Nagel, & 
Wiegmann, 2012). Future studies are required to shed 
light on this issue. Such studies could employ the ques-
tionnaire developed in the present study as it includes 
vignettes which have proven to be well suited to inves-
tigate the effect of emotions.
Additionally, here we focused on analyzing the emo-
tional dimensions of valence and arousal. However, 
recent research has shown that different emotions 
with the same valence can have opposing effects 
on moral judgment (Strohminger et al., 2011; Ugazio 
et al., 2012), stressing that aspects such as the moti-
vational dimension of emotions must also be taken 
into account to fully understand the effect of emo-
tions on judgments. Thus, future work should deter-
mine whether our findings hold for discrete negative 
emotions such as anger, or positive emotions such as 
elevation.
Finally, our participants were undergraduate stu-
dents of Psychology, most of them young females. 
Previous studies have reported that females tend to 
be more severe when judging moral transgressions 
(Schnall et al., 2008), and that they are more sensitive 
to disgust than males (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 
1994). Future research should look for the generality 
of the present results varying the sociodemographic 
features of participants, such as age and level of educa-
tion, and increasing the proportion of males in the 
sample in order to control for this potential confound-
ing variable.
In summary, our findings provide evidence that 
negatively valenced images can have an effect on the 
evaluation of moral transgressions that are generally 
not associated with extreme judgments, while this is 
not the case for positively valenced ones. The finding 
that both types of images triggered similar levels of 
arousal supports the notion that this factor cannot 
account for the observed influence of emotions on 
moral judgments. The reason for which positive images 
did not affect judgments remains unclear, as does the 
question of whether naturally occurring positive emo-
tions can have an effect. Future work investigating 
these questions holds the promise of uncovering key 
aspects of an issue which is ubiquitous in everyday 
life and which can have critical consequences, that 
is, our moral judgments concerning other people’s 
behavior.
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Appendix
Moral vignettes questionnaire (Form A; translated 
from Spanish). Vignettes 4 and 10 were rated extremely 
in Study 1, with the highest and lowest severity 
respectively.
 
 1.  Daniel is traveling in a plane with his dog. The 
plane crashes into the mountain and the dog dies. 
Daniel buries the dog in the snow. He has enough 
water to survive a few weeks, but not enough 
food. Considering the possibility of starvation, 
he decides to eat the dog.
 2.  Lucy finds a wallet in the street with 300 euros in it. 
She has been unemployed for a couple of months. 
Judging from the credit cards it contains, and other 
details, she figures that the wallet belongs to a 
wealthy man. She decides to keep the money, yet 
return the wallet by mail.
 3.  Pepi and Mario are first cousins. They are traveling 
together during the summer. One night while they 
are alone they start touching each other and end 
up having sexual intercourse.
 4.  Diego is driving back home on a Friday night after 
having some drinks with his friends. He comes to 
an intersection but is too drunk to notice that the 
light is red. Diego crosses the intersection while 
the light is red and almost runs over a pedestrian 
who was correctly crossing the street. Diego arrives 
home safely without further incident.
 5.  Some years ago Carla was single and she went to 
visit a friend in Ibiza. She felt extremely attracted 
to a man who she knew was married. Carla danced 
with him as close as she could but she didn’t do 
anything else.
 6.  Toño used to work for the government. He used 
a laptop from the office, while at home, to do audits. 
After he left the job, he kept the laptop that belonged 
to the government.
 7.  Gonzalo was a soccer trainer for a school team. 
He frequently spent time with the kids’ mothers 
and he found some of them very attractive. Some of 
the women found him attractive as well. He slept 
with some of the women more than once.
 8.  Eugenia became pregnant for the second time. It 
was only 9 months after having her first son. She 
was financially incapable of raising two kids at this 
moment, so she decided to have an abortion.
 9.  Victor and his friends traveled to Eastern Europe 
during their graduation trip. One night they decided 
to go to a brothel. The women were very attractive 
and they didn’t charge much money for their ser-
vices. Victor slept with one of them.
 10.  Teresa accepted a job offer in a company. But later 
she realized that the pay wasn’t enough for the 
amount of work she was doing. So she lied and told 
her supervisor that she had another job offer, and 
said she would take it unless they gave her a raise. 
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